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University of California, San Diego
Revolution creates an “historical void that sepa-
rates one regime from another, and where es-
tablished institutions give way to the idea that 
human action can impose itself on history”.1 
What François Furet meant by this was that 
revolutions create an empty space between re-
gimes. What I want to do in this article is to fill 
that void in regards to regimes of violence. To 
start with an obvious point: revolutions are vi-
olent. But, historiographically, the study of vio-
lence has been parsed out into different com-
ponents studied by various branches of the 
discipline. For example, war and the violence 
attendant to it have been the purview of military 
historians. Interpersonal violence has largely 
fallen to social historians, whereas the crimi-
nalisation or the legal discourse over what con-
stitutes unlawful violence has been dominated 
by legal scholars. My contention is that the study 
of violence must be studied more holistically in 
what I wish to call “regimes of violence”. Every 
society, I would submit, manifests a specific re-
gime at any given historical moment, and that 
regimes change over time. The concern of this 
paper is the relationship between regimes of vi-
olence and revolution, and how regimes change 
in the aftermath of rebellion.
Much of the literature on revolutions focuses on 
the ideas that motivated people to rise up in re-
bellion against their government. And this is to-
tally appropriate. After all, there have to be ideas 
that challenge the status quo and that give peo-
ple a vision of a future different from the reali-
ty they are currently living through. A good deal 
of attention has been paid as well to the intel-
lectuals who disseminated those revolutionary 
ideas to the masses.2 But ideas are not enough. 
Insurrections, whether they end successfully in 
a revolution or fail and become labelled as civil 








wars, require fighters. Certainly scholars have studied collective violence, endeavouring to explain 
how and why regular people join an insurrection, but a critically important group has been left out 
of most of those studies.3 While the image of the peasant putting down his plough and picking up 
a gun to join a rebellion is as compelling as it is romantic, it masks a simple truth: most of the time 
peasants do not make good fighters. The willingness to deploy lethal violence against another hu-
man being requires cultural desensitisation to a fundamental ethical tenet. But in every society 
there emerges men for whom this is not so. Historically, at the heart of every insurrection there 
was a core of men for whom a propensity to violence was a way of life. I refer to these men as “mil-
itary entrepreneurs”.4 These were men who were well-versed in the martial arts, who possessed 
arms and knew how to use them and for whom violence was mundane. Revolutionary violence, 
then, cannot be understood without studying it in its broader social context and in order to do that 
we need to focus on cultural regimes of violence.
My article proceeds from two fundamental propositions. The first of these is that states seek to ex-
ert a monopoly over legitimate violence. This is an idea with a long history going back to the founda-
tional works of Max Weber and associated most recently with numerous studies by Charles Tilly.5 
It stems from the fact that a violent act in and of itself is either lawful or criminal depending on the 
dictates of the state as expressed in law. States, then, determine the legitimacy or illegitimacy of 
violence, deeming acts committed by state agencies such as the military and the police as lawful, 
while those perpetrated by others as criminal. States, then, strive to create a situation where there 
is a single node of legitimate violence, and where multiple nodes exist – as we will see, they often 
did in the past – it strives to suppress them.
My second proposition is that revolutions must be studied globally and across time. Most fre-
quently, historians have adopted a comparative approach whereby they examine revolutions and 
compare and contrast them.6 This has, of course, produced very fruitful insights, but we need to 
go further. As well as highlighting similarities and differences between different insurrections and 
revolutions, we need as well to examine them in a transglobal framework that emphasises what 
connects them. We need to focus on the flows and movements of people and ideas that connected 
revolutionary movements around the world in the past – or indeed in the present for that matter. 
Whether it be jihadists from around the world flocking to Syria to join Isis today or Harvard stu-
dents motivated by the spirit of philhellenism to support the Greek insurrection of 1821, revolutions 
have always been transregional phenomena. We should also reconstruct what I call repertoires 
of revolution that both motivated and shaped collective action. These repertoires included modes 
of action, intellectual discourses and verbal and material symbols as well. In order to conduct this 
type of research, however, we need frameworks of analysis that allow us to examine revolutions 
cross-culturally. Without them we risk either lapsing into simple empiricism, whereby each revo-
lution is seen as an entity unto itself, or into exceptionalism, whereby each revolution, particularly 
a national revolution, is seen as being sui generis.
I would submit that one of the frameworks of analysis that we need focuses on regimes of vio-
lence. In the next section, I lay out two models of polar opposite regimes of violence. The models 
consist of a set of interlinked variables, some cultural, some political and some structural. They 
are meant to be seen as ideal types or models, and thus are only approximations of reality. In other 
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words, they are not descriptions of any actual lived reality but instead represent hypothetical ex-
tremes. The models are not intended to predict where or when revolutions will break out, though 
I suspect that there is a relationship between certain types of regimes of violence and sociopolit-
ical instability that could lead to insurrections. That can only be determined, however, when other 
frameworks of analysis are employed to examine critically important related topics, such as the 
development and dissemination of revolutionary ideologies and economic factors that could lead 
to political instability. What the models are intended to do is to help us understand which sorts of 
regimes of violence produce men of violence, or military entrepreneurs as I labelled them earlier. 
We need to envision a spectrum of regimes of violence, with the two to be described in the next 
section as the extremes at either end. By inserting historical data into each of the variable catego-
ries of the models, we can reconstruct actual regimes of violence and then assess where they fit on 
the spectrum. Let me begin with what I will call the type I or the weak/decentralised state model.
In this model the state is incapable of exerting a monopoly over legitimate violence. The reasons 
for its inability to do so could be many and they need to be determined in each historical instance. 
The key variable here would be the efficacy of the institutions crucial for maintaining social order, 
those being in most instances the police and military. The result of their inability to maintain public 
order and to enforce the writ of the state is the creation of multiple and competing nodes of vio-
lence. This in and of itself would create a state that is riven with divisions and fissures. These al-
ternative sources of power could challenge the power and authority of the central state and could 
be in competition with one another. In the absence of a strong police or military, the state has to 
rely on irregular forces or militias to maintain public order. When the men of violence who staffed 
these institutions operated with the blessing of the state, they are legitimate; but when they do not 
or when they sell their services to one of the competing nodes of power in a decentralised state, 








they are illegitimate or outlaws. A recurring characteristic of the weak state is the fluorescence of 
banditry. But where do these men of violence, these military entrepreneurs, come from? To an-
swer that question, we have to look to cultural variables.
Another characteristic of the weak state is that its institutions of criminal justice are either underde-
veloped or lack legitimacy. The result is that men do not turn to the state to resolve interpersonal dis-
putes but instead do so on their own. Men in such societies seek “self-help justice”, even if in doing so 
they violate the state’s laws. They also need to demonstrate publicly that they are willing to deploy all 
means at their disposal to right a wrong or to address a perceived slight, even if that entails resort-
ing to violence. Almost invariably in cultures where this is the case, aggression becomes a prized 
feature of masculinity. Correspondingly, they also develop a cultural ethic that legitimises male ag-
gression and frequently that ethic is “honour” or something like it. Violence in these situations be-
comes socially normative. Two critically important elements emerge in this situation: first, these 
become societies that manifest very high levels of interpersonal violence, and much of that violence 
is ritualised, taking the form of duels, vendettas, revenge killings and feuds and, second, weapons, 
especially firearms, and the men who know how to use them, become plentiful. Not all men in such 
societies, of course, take up violence as a vocation and become military entrepreneurs but many do.
Our second ideal type or model resides at the opposite end of the spectrum of regimes of violence 
and we can refer to it as the type II or strong/centralised state model. 
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In this situation, the state exerts a monopoly over legitimate violence. In this unimodal situation, 
the state’s institutions of public order, the police and military, are strongly developed and enjoy le-
gitimacy in society as a whole. In this model the military is usually a standing army that relies on 
conscription or mandatory military service. The criminal justice system in this situation also ap-
pears as a very prominent feature. People recognise the authority of the court system to adjudicate 
disputes and to address grievances.
Culturally a very different manifestation of masculinity develops. While ethical concepts such as 
honour may remain culturally present, absent is the prevalence of aggression in them. Instead, 
interpersonal violence is seen as deviant and socially dysfunctional. In addition to there being new 
social norms that anathematise violence, institutions such as the military inculcate values that 
channel masculine violence towards goals defined by the state. This is where the military plays 
an important role. This models envisions a situation where very large numbers of young men go 
through military training during which they internalise values such as obedience and self-control. 
Most certainly they are also trained to kill but the key difference here is that that violence is direct-
ed to serve the interests of the state. The critical outcome of the interaction of the variables in this 
model is that: first, they produce societies in which only a limited sector of the population has ac-
cess to weapons and, second, they manifest much lower levels of interpersonal violence. The re-
gime of violence manifested in a strong state model is one unlikely to produce either military en-
trepreneurs, who could play that critically important role in an insurrection, or nodes of violence 
outside of the state’s control that could challenge its monopoly over legitimate violence. I would 
also suggest that revolution is less likely in societies whose regimes of violence resemble more 
closely the strong state model.
My second argument is that understanding how regimes of violence change over time is critically 
important. In regards to this article, I suggest that revolutions create a void, as Furet suggested, 
and that they represent a transitional and transformative moment. Whether an insurrection fails 
or is successful, a process of state formation or reformation ensues in its aftermath, and an es-
sential part of that process focuses on regimes of violence. It is through the process of state 
(re)formation that the institutions at the centre of the regime of violence take shape and form and, 
by so doing, create a regime closer to the type II end of the spectrum.
The case of Greece and the Ottoman empire from the late eighteenth to the late nineteenth centu-
ries provides us with a good example for examining the applicability of the frame of analysis out-
lined above.
By the second half of the eighteenth century, the once mighty and feared Ottoman military machine 
was but a pale comparison of its former self. There were still the Janissary corps and a sizable con-
tingent of timar cavalry, but neither of them were the formidable forces that they had once been. In 
the case of the Janissaries, the abolition of the devşirme system earlier in the century, the Patro-
na Halil revolt of 1730 and the long period of quiescence between wars (1739–68) transformed the 
corps from a full-time military organisation into part-time militia manned by cooks, petty crafts-
men and pimps.7 Indeed, in many ways they had become an impediment rather than a means to 
the state’s ability to maintain public order.8 








Even more dramatic was the precipitous decline in the competency of the cavalry. Though ti-
mar-holders were still expected to take to the field as sipahis, heavily armoured mounted warri-
ors, their numbers were greatly reduced and few of them were trained and combat ready. For the 
first time, the majority of the Ottoman military consisted of armed irregulars of the levend. Like 
other states in Europe, the Ottoman empire recruited men to form armed militias. These men were 
mobilised and served in the region they were from and their main function was to assist the local 
government in maintaining law and order. In wartime they would be mustered to supplement the 
Janissaries and the sipahis. During the eighteenth century, as more power was devolved to the 
local level, regional officials had to rely increasingly on the levend. When the empire embarked on 
war with Russia, the orders went out to ayan and kadis at the kaza level (this being a district with-
in an administrative province) to enrol militia troops. According to the best estimate we have, the 
main fighting force mobilised by the empire at the start of the 1768–74 war with Russia consisted 
of between 100,000 and 150,000 troops, which were recruited through the levend. Poorly trained 
and lacking in discipline, these irregulars constituted the core of the Ottoman army that faced Rus-
sia in the northern campaign along the Danube.
The following quote from the leading Ottoman military historian captures some additional dimen-
sions regarding the development of a Muslim militia:
Roving bands, once organized into fighting forces, were called household levend, or state lev-
end, the distinction being whether they were part of the provincial governor’s personal forc-
es (kapili or kapi halki) or were paid directly by the state (miri). The bands were organized into 
companies (bayrak or bölük), generally of 50 soldiers, and could be either cavalry or infantry. 
Their commander was a bölükbaşi.9
The first important point is that some militia groups were controlled by the central state, while 
others were under the command of local officials. This created a multinodal military apparatus, or 
to put it another way, this was a system in which the central state certainly did not exercise a mo-
nopoly over legitimate force. Local officials had under their command a military force, which, as 
we will see, could be used either to support or to challenge central state authority. Some regional 
officials, like Tepedelenli Ali Paşa of Ioannina and Pasvanoğlu Osman Paşa of Vidin, had at their 
disposal so many men that we could actually consider their militias as small armies. The second 
element to note is that when not operating in an official capacity and paid for by the government, 
militiamen became “roving bands” of outlaws. There developed then a large cadre of Muslim mili-
tary entrepreneurs. But the story does not end there: certain factors led to the development of large 
numbers of Christian military entrepreneurs as well.
Each time the Ottoman empire went to war, tens of thousands of Muslim men were mobilised 
through the levend system to serve as irregular troops; at the same time, non-Muslims, particu-
larly Greek and Christian Albanian warriors, were hired and deployed as armatoles and derbends 
to guard the empire’s roads and mountain passes. At war’s end, the levend troops were demobi-
lised and many armatoles went out of government service. This produced a huge number of un-
employed or underemployed armed men. Some were hired by local lords to fill their private gangs, 
while others were retained for garrison duty. Many, however, took to the mountains and became 
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outlaws. At times the fighting between the armatoles and brigands was fierce. So, in some ways, 
when the empire’s external wars ended, a form of internal strife took their place.
The Napoleonic wars quickened the pace and expanded the magnitude of military entrepreneur-
ship in the region. The war stretched Ottoman resources thinly and, since so many Muslim levend 
troops were fighting on the Danubian front, the empire and many local authorities had to rely on 
non-Muslim, mostly Orthodox Greek and Albanian armatoles, to act as the internal police force. In 
addition, there were other Orthodox Greeks and Albanians who were getting weapons and learn-
ing how to use them. The Great Powers, and especially the British, organised and trained local men 
into bands of irregulars.
The most famous of these groups were the Corsican Rangers, a highly decorated and battle-hard-
ened corps that was made up of men of many different nationalities and not just Corsicans. As 
Britain and France became more deeply involved in the Balkans, they formed local irregular corps 
there. During the French occupation of the Ionian Islands, for example, General François-Xavier 
Donzelot recruited and trained a force of over 5,000 Greeks and Albanians, mostly from the main-
land. After the British established a stronghold on the island of Zakynthos in 1809, many of these 
men joined the Duke of York’s new Greek Light Infantry. Austria organised ethnic Serbs into irreg-
ular units called the Freicorps. The Russians regularly recruited irregular bands of Balkan Chris-
tians (Serbs, Greeks, Albanians, Romanians and others) in Moldavia and Wallachia to support their 
regular army. The bottom line was that at the end of the Napoleonic wars there were many more 
Orthodox Christians who had guns and knew how to use them.10 In sum, by the 1810s the Ottoman 
regime of violence was moving increasingly closer to a type I model. But what of the other ele-
ment we discussed earlier, that of a culture of violence? That also seems to have been prevalent.
While more work needs to be done on the topics of masculinity and violence in the Greek world 
before 1821, the existing scholarship strongly suggests that the Ottoman criminal justice system 
lacked widespread legitimacy, particularly among the non-Muslim population. One of the charac-
teristics of the system of that time was legal pluralism, whereby there were a number of different 
legal fora that people could resort to to settle disputes. These included the kadi court, the Orthodox 
ecclesiastical court and local level councils usually composed of elderly men. While the system had 
certain strengths, it also had profound weaknesses, the most important of which for our purposes 
was that none of them could command total respect and enforce the writ of law. The result was 
the development of a flourishing system of self-help justice.11 Correspondingly, as we discussed 
earlier, this led to a cultural ethos that privileged masculine aggression. It was this type of cultural 
system that produced men well-versed in violence, some of whom would deploy skills with guns 
and swords professionally as military entrepreneurs.
The existence of a type I regime of violence in the Ottoman empire in the early nineteenth century 
is insufficient to explain the insurrection of 1821. No revolution can be attributed to just one single 
factor or cause. But I would submit that the existence of this type of regime of violence made rev-
olution possible, if not even more likely. Regarding what transpired during the course of the insur-
rection itself, little need be said here.12 That for most of the time the actual fighting was between 
Ottoman levend militia and Greek military bands is a point that has been made repeatedly.13 What I 








want to do in the remainder of this article is to examine the nature and the character of the regime 
of violence that developed in independent Greece. In spite of state-building efforts during the nine-
teenth century that included attempts to shift the regime of violence from being closer to the type I 
to the type II model, the process remained incomplete and the transition unfulfilled. The failure of 
the Greek kingdom to transform the regime of violence had profound consequences that would 
continue to reverberate well into the twentieth century.
In regards to developing the critical institutions that shaped its regime of violence, the fledgling 
Greek state faced formidable challenges, the most of important of these being financial. I begin 
with the military. Even during the course of the war, the provisional revolutionary government and 
then the government of Ioannis Kapodstrias tried to create a regular, western-style army. Neither 
got very far. During the first years of the Bavarian monarchy, the Greek army consisted of a core 
of 3,500 well-trained Bavarian troops, augmented by 5,000 German volunteers and a relatively 
modest number of Greek recruits. By the time of the first constitution (1844), the German troops 
were mostly gone and Greeks constituted the central element of the army. But the force remained 
small in size and thus incapable either of providing the state with an effective fighting force against 
external foes, meaning essentially here the Ottoman empire, or of enforcing internal public order. 
This impaired development had many consequences; the most important one for our purposes 
was that the Greek state had to rely continually on irregular fighters to perform basic military tasks. 
For example, throughout much of the nineteenth century, the state hired such military entrepre-
neurs to patrol the border with the Ottoman empire.14 In like vein, recurrently the state deployed 
irregulars against the Ottomans in furtherance of Greek irredentism.15 This occurred in 1853 and 
1854 in the context of the Crimean war, and again in the 1860s on Crete and even as late as 1877 
and 1878 during the Russian–Ottoman war. It was really only during the 1880s that Greece began 
to develop a regular army of significant magnitude.16
A further consequence of the absence of a large regular army was that the state was incapable of 
exerting a monopoly on legitimate violence. There continued to be during the formative years of 
the kingdom multiple nodes of legitimate violence, legitimate at least in the eyes of the people but 
not the state. Large gangs of irregular fighters rallied around captains, many of whom had par-
ticipated in the war of independence; some of them, like the band led by General Theodoros Gri-
vas, grew in size to rival a small army. As often happens in places where warlordism flourished, 
civil unrest in the form of violent protests and tax riots erupted. And this was certainly the case in 
Greece during the 1830s and 1840s.17
Another area of incomplete state formation related to the criminal justice system. This was not 
for want of trying. The Bavarian regime introduced a standardised, uniform code of criminal law 
based on the “modern” tenets of German jurisprudence, while at the same time taking into account 
the great diversity of local customs of dispute resolution.18 In spite of this attempt to be sensitive 
to indigenous practices, neither the law nor the criminal court system given the task of impos-
ing it gained much traction with Greek men. As numerous case studies have shown, throughout 
the nineteenth century Greek men opted for self-help justice to resolve their disputes rather than 
bringing them to the docket of the state’s criminal courts.19 Compounding the problem of the crim-
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inal justice system’s lack of legitimacy was the absence of effective police forces. More often than 
not, the rural gendarmerie, for example, was more exploitative than it was protective of rural pop-
ulations. In large part this was because the state lacked the resources to eradicate banditry and 
outlawry by force and so resorted to the expedient of hiring brigands to be the police.20 The result 
of the failure to create a fully functioning and legitimate criminal justice system was that many ar-
eas of Greece manifested extremely high levels of interpersonal violence. Ritualised violence in 
the form of knife fights, revenge homicides and feuds were normative features in much of rural 
and urban society. The cultural construction of masculinity had at its core an ethic that privileged 
aggression. A man was expected to respond to any challenge to his reputation or any threat to his 
household’s property with aggression and violence, even at times lethal violence. It is from such a 
society that military entrepreneurs emerged.
In conclusion, then, the regime of violence in nineteenth-century Greece bore a marked resem-
blance to the one that flourished before the war of independence. This is not to say that state-build-
ing processes during the long nineteenth century failed completely to shift it to a point closer to 
a type II model on the spectrum of regimes of violence. Beginning with the reformist agenda of 
Harilaos Trikoupis, significant strides were made. His reforms of the criminal justice system, his 
expansion of both metropolitan and rural police forces, and the large investment his government 
made in expanding the Greek army, all contributed to reforming the regime of violence. These 
measures, along with other factors, inaugurated a social transformation, whereby Greek men be-
gan to accept the institutions of the state as legitimate, and so increasingly they called on them to 
solve disputes and to restore reputations. More concretely, what we see in the historical record 
is a diminution in the level of interpersonal violence and a shift, albeit a gradual one, in the social 
acceptance of masculine aggression.21 Nonetheless, the process of transformation from a type I 
regime of violence to a type II one remained incomplete. The consequence of this was that many 
of the fault lines inherent in a political system with a type I regime persisted in Greece well into the 
twentieth century.
A second conclusion relates to the study of revolutions more broadly. In order to study revolutions 
across time and space, we need to develop analytical frameworks that will enable us to identify 
the most important causal factors. Some of these frameworks should focus on the ideas and ide-
ologies that motivate men and women to rise in rebellion; others should concentrate on the social 
and culture milieus that enabled those ideas and ideologies to gain traction and popular accept-
ance. What I hope to have shown in this article is that we need a framework of analysis that ex-
amines violence.
Revolutions are by definition violent events and so require men for whom violence is a way of life. 
The analytical framework proposed in this article both identifies a set of key variables relating to 
societal regimes of violence and the interactive connections between those variables. It also pos-
tulates that there exists a spectrum of regimes of violence with two polar opposite ideal types, one 
that I have labelled as type I and the other as type II. All societies manifest a regime of violence that 
fits somewhere along the spectrum, and those regimes closer to type I are more unstable and 
more likely to produce the conditions necessary for a revolution to occur. I suggest as well that as 
part of the postrevolutionary state-building process, governments try to create a new regime of 








violence that resembles a type II model. In this article, I used the case of Greece to show what such 
a study would look like. What we need now are studies empirically grounded elsewhere that both 
try to understand individual revolutions on their own but also as part of our efforts to comprehend 
revolutionary processes more broadly. We need in particular analyses of prerevolutionary regimes 
of violence. Above all, what I hope to have shown here is that the study of regimes of violence is 
essential if we are ever going to fully understand revolution and postrevolutionary state formation.
NOTES
1   Cited in Michael Broers, Napoleon’s other war: bandits, rebels and their pursuers in the age of revolu-
tions (Witney: Peter Lang, 2010), xi.
2   For an over of theories of revolution, see Jack A. Goldstone, “Toward a fourth generation of revolution-
ary theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 139–187. There is a very large body of literature 
that discusses specific revolutions. I have chosen not to present an overview of that vast corpus here 
but instead I want to concentrate on a few important works that endeavour to address the broader is-
sue of violence in society and a propensity for political instability and insurrections. 
3   See, for example, Stathis N. Kalyvas, The logic of violence in civil war (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); Paul Staniland, Networks of rebellion: explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2014); Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside rebellion: the politics of insurgent violence 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
4   Thomas W. Gallant, “Brigandage, piracy, capitalism, and state-formation: transnational crime from a 
historical world systems perspective,” in States and illegal networks, ed. Josh Heyman (London: Berg, 
1999), 27.
5   Charles Tilly, The politics of collective violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
6   David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds, The age of revolutions in global context, c. 1760–1840 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
7   Christopher Tuck, “All innovation leads to hellfire: military reform and the Ottoman empire in the eight-
eenth century,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31/3 (2008): 467–502, esp. 471.
8   Selim Karahasanoğlu, Politics and governance in the Ottoman empire: the rebellion of 1730 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
9   Virginia H. Aksan, “Whatever happened to the janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768–1774 Russo– 
Ottoman war,” War in History 5/1 (1998): 28.
10   Thomas W. Gallant, The Edinburgh history of the Greeks, 1768 to 1913: the long nineteenth century (Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 30–32, 47–50; Tolga U. Esmer, “Economies of violence, 
banditry and governance in the Ottoman empire around 1800,” Past & Present 224/1 (2014): 163–199.
11   Fariba Zarinebaf, Crime and punishment in Istanbul: 1700–1800 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2010); Frederick F. Anscombe, “The Balkan revolutionary age,” Journal of Modern History 84/3 (2012): 
572–606. 
12   Gallant, Edinburgh history, 70–98; George A. Kourvetaris, “Greek armed forces and society in the nine-
teenth century, with special emphasis on the Greek revolution of 1821,” in East central European soci-
ety and war in the era of revolutions, 1775–1856, ed. Béla K. Király (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 
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